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When citizens ask questions, how does their government answer? Requests for government information confront ofﬁcials
with incentives both for and against disclosure. We argue that ofﬁcials seek to manage political risks in ways that favor
requests from government-aligned regions. We study responsiveness in the context of Mexico’s access-to-information law,
using publicly available data from several hundred thousand information requests ﬁled with Mexican federal government
agencies between 2003 and 2015. Our empirical strategy makes comparisons only among requests sent to similar agencies
on similar topics at similar times, while accounting for the complexity, sophistication, and sensitivity of individual requests. We ﬁnd that requests ﬁled from locales with higher governing-party vote shares receive more favorable responses,
across multiple indicators of the nature and timing of responses. Further, we ﬁnd bias only for requests on publicly relevant topics, providing evidence in favor of a mechanism of mitigating political risks over one of rewarding supporters
with greater access to beneﬁts.

T

o whom are agents of accountability themselves accountable? Government ofﬁcials charged with responding to citizen queries and disclosing ofﬁcial information
play a fundamental role in downward “vertical accountability,”
in which the state answers to citizens for its actions (O’Donnell
1998; Schedler 1999). And yet, as agents of political principals—
both their hierarchical superiors and elected politicians—they
may face conﬂicting incentives to also be accountable upward,
in ways that inhibit the provision of information to citizens.
How do government ofﬁcials resolve these roles, and with what
effects on responsiveness to citizens?
While many scholars have studied how electorally motivated discretion drives government expenditures or public
goods provision (Besley and Burgess 2002; Carlitz 2017; DiazCayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni 2016; Golden and Min 2013;

Kramon and Posner 2013; Stokes et al. 2013), government responsiveness extends beyond spending decisions: governments
interface with citizens in millions of everyday interactions, in
which agents of the state may vary in their responsiveness to
citizen needs. We examine government responsiveness in one
case of frequent citizen-government interaction: responses to
citizen requests for government information in Mexico. To
do so, we use a novel data set incorporating every information
request ﬁled with Mexican federal government agencies between 2003 and 2015.
Much like government expenditures, government information can be divided into particularistic and public categories. For instance, information useful in applying for government beneﬁts or employment serves the requester’s private
interest, while information that reveals government corruption
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or inefﬁciency serves the public’s interest in good governance.
While this categorization mirrors the public-private goods distinction made in the distributive politics literature, the provision of government information produces a different set of
incentives for politicians than does distributive spending, in
particular because publicly relevant information can present
a political risk to the incumbent administration.
We thus focus attention on the incentives at work in the
speciﬁc domain of government information. Ofﬁcials charged
with responding to citizens serve two distinct roles that are
central to democratic governance and accountability. First, they
are gatekeepers for information about government activities—
from budgets to security to evidence of corruption—relevant
for citizens’ retrospective evaluations of government performance, a central component of democratic accountability (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999). Second, they provide information useful for guiding citizens’ everyday dealings with
government agencies, such as applying for beneﬁts, acquiring
titles or permits, or seeking government employment. As the
timely access to such information confers material advantages,
it can become a currency of clientelism if granted discretionarily
according to partisanship (Stokes et al. 2013, 7). Following from
these two roles, discretionary nondisclosure of public information can either challenge political accountability or can
hinder the quality of governance by violating the principle of
impartiality (Rothstein and Teorell 2008) in the provision of
public goods and services. It is the goal of this paper to assess
these two forms of discretionary disclosure.
For the agents of accountability at the heart of this process, motivations for responding positively include commitment to the goals of transparency as a tool for downward
accountability, as well as avoiding formal or informal sanctions through state institutions of horizontal accountability.
Such agents may also be motivated by partisan incentives to
provide information that helps political allies access state beneﬁts or navigate regulatory processes. However, they also have
many reasons to be less responsive, particularly concerning the
risk of unwanted disclosures resulting in scandal or negative
media attention that might harm the reputation of their agency’s
leadership or the political goals of the ruling party—both
forms of upward accountability.
How do ofﬁcials manage these competing incentives regarding disclosure of government information? We argue that
ofﬁcials ﬁlter and discriminate based on the perceived political
risk of requests, informed by the partisan alignment of communities where requests originate. However, counter to the
distributive politics literature, which expects discretionary targeting of private goods, we argue that ofﬁcials prioritize areas
of core support in the provision of information that is most
publicly relevant. As the latter type of information presents a

greater risk of generating negative attention, politicians and
their agents prefer to withhold this information from political opponents where possible. We thus suggest that government responsiveness in the domain of information, rather
than spending or material goods, is better understood through
such a logic of managing risks rather than a logic of targeting
beneﬁts.
We test these expectations by comparing the quality of
responses across requests originating from municipalities with
varying levels of support for the governing party—but ﬁled
through the same centralized and ostensibly anonymous system. We address heterogeneity in requests originating in areas
of high and low governing-party support by considering variation only among requests sent to the same government agency,
on the same topic, and in the same year, and by incorporating text-based information on the complexity, sensitivity, legalism, and sophistication of individual requests. To control
for the topics underlying requests, we use unsupervised topic
models to classify requests into twenty topics, which we categorize as either primarily publicly relevant (e.g., budgets and
spending, security issues, and environmental disputes) or primarily related to private goals (e.g., accessing services and beneﬁts, or seeking jobs or contracts).
We ﬁnd evidence that requests ﬁled from areas of stronger
government support receive more favorable responses: faster,
less likely to claim the information does not exist, and less likely
to raise ﬁnancial or physical barriers. These results are stronger
among publicly relevant topics than among topics with a more
private focus, consistent with a mechanism of ofﬁcials managing political risk, and inconsistent with a mechanism of
rewarding allies with preferential access to material beneﬁts.
Further analyses reveal evidence of within-municipality variation in responsiveness over time, exploiting changes in political alignment after the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
regained presidential power in 2012.
Using qualitative evidence, we surmise that bias in responsiveness to information requests is primarily due to ofﬁcials inferring the political risk posed by a given request based on the
traits of the municipality from which it originates—information that is often readily available to the bureaucrat. However,
in some cases ofﬁcials may be able to more precisely infer the
identity of the requester and thus discriminate against political opponents or notable watchdog groups. Observationally,
this more ﬁne-grained discretion would yield the same results
that we observe: worse responses to information requests that
come from areas where political opponents of the ruling party
predominate.
Interviews with bureaucrats at several liaison units charged
with handling information requests in government agencies illustrate that the types of discretion we elucidate are procedurally
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feasible and clarify the conﬂicting incentives presented by
requests for government information. While Mexico’s accessto-information (ATI) system was designed to “level the playing
ﬁeld” by anonymizing requests, liaison unit personnel report
several informal avenues by which requester traits can potentially become known and inﬂuence responsiveness. Further,
ofﬁcials described both incentives favoring disclosure—such
as avoiding sanctions for noncompliance or commitment to
the goals of the transparency law—as well as considerations of
the political risk that disclosure may pose to their supervisors
and political principals, particularly for sensitive topics.
While we expect similar political dynamics to be at work
in countries other than Mexico, this context offers several
advantages for our analysis. On a practical level, the online
request system offers richly detailed data over a long period
of time. More crucially, as a federal democracy with stable
multiparty competition, Mexico presents signiﬁcant regional
variation in political dynamics. Moreover, while Mexico has
been at the vanguard among transitional democracies in the
design and implementation of ATI institutions, persistent corruption and bureaucratic discretion introduce both motive and
opportunity for biased responsiveness to information requests.
However, we expect that our ﬁndings would extend to other
contexts where bureaucrats have discretion in disclosing government information, yet face political risks in doing so.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS
AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
We combine insights from two literatures on government
responsiveness. First, studies of policy responsiveness address
the extent to which government policies respond to voter
preferences (Golden and Min 2013). Such studies focus on
partisan incentives that shape government spending and public goods provision, typically across subnational units (Besley
and Burgess 2002; Cleary 2007; Magaloni 2006). A central debate
in this literature regards how politicians allocate beneﬁts between areas of ruling- and opposition-party strength (DiazCayeros et al. 2016; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014;
Stokes et al. 2013).
A second group analyzes individual responsiveness, the
extent to which individual citizen needs are met in everyday
interactions with the state. Recent studies have identiﬁed bias
regarding citizens’ inferred race, ethnicity, gender, and social
status (Butler and Broockman 2011; Distelhorst and Hou 2014;
McClendon 2016; White, Nathan, and Faller 2015). Studies
of responsiveness to information requests, the present focus,
have identiﬁed differences based on the threat of collective
action in China (Chen, Pan, and Xu 2016) and the design of
government agencies in the United States (Wood and Lewis
2017). And studies of ATI in Mexico speciﬁcally have identi-
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ﬁed limited favoritism of citizens with implied political connections (Lagunes and Pocasangre 2019)1 and biases against
citizens seeking information about the drug war (Almanzar,
Aspinwall, and Crow 2018). Yet we lack understanding of how
broader partisan objectives shape bureaucratic responsiveness
in interactions with individual citizens.
ATI institutions enable citizens to request information from
public ofﬁcials, and obligate ofﬁcials to respond, subject to
certain legal exemptions. In practice, ofﬁcials operate in conditions of limited capacity (in terms of staff, ﬁnances, and
records-management systems), substantial discretion, and inconsistent oversight, making ATI institutions a promising venue
to study responsiveness. Further, they generate data about responsiveness across two quite different areas of citizen activity:
private goals for the beneﬁt of the requester and public goals
related to governance and accountability (Michener and Worthy 2018). Information requests in the former category include,
for example, questions about how to access government beneﬁts or programs, conduct bureaucratic procedures, or seek
government contracts or jobs. Public goals, on the other hand,
include investigating corruption, patronage, or other wrongdoing, evaluating decision-making or policy effectiveness, and
mobilizing for political action. Similar to studies that ﬁnd different targeting logics for different types of distributive goods
(Albertus 2012; Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2016; Kramon and Posner
2013; Palmer-Rubin 2016), we postulate that public and private
varieties of information generate different incentive structures
for ofﬁcials.
As shown in table 1, certain incentives favor responsiveness across both public and private information. Disclosure of
requested information provides citizens a positive impression
of government performance. Ofﬁcials may feel committed to
comply with legal mandates or the ethos of transparency, or
may wish to avoid sanction for nondisclosure, either within
their agencies or from oversight bodies. Ofﬁcials also have reasons to be unresponsive to all types of information requests.
Aside from standard criteria for withholding information (conﬁdentiality, national security, commercial secrets, etc.), bureaucrats may be discretionarily unresponsive out of an interest in
minimizing workloads, particularly in understaffed agencies.
However, other potential incentives, denoted in italics, are
speciﬁc to the type of information. A core consideration in
disclosing public information is political risk: the potential of
the requested information to damage the reputation of the
agency, its leadership, or the governing party. Political elites
from the ruling party clearly wish to avoid scandals, investigations, or information revelations in the media that might

1. Michener et al. (2020) ﬁnd similar results in Brazil.
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Table 1. Incentives For and Against Information Disclosure
Incentives for Disclosure

Incentives against Disclosure

Information for public goals

Demonstrating performance; Personal commitment;
Avoiding sanctions

Limiting workload; Complying with legal
exemptions; Managing political risks

Information for private goals

Demonstrating performance; Personal commitment;
Avoiding sanctions; Targeting beneﬁts

Limiting workload; Complying with legal
exemptions

Note. Potential incentives that are speciﬁc to the type of information requested are denoted in italics.

harm themselves or their allies. Agency leaders also seek to
protect their own future political careers. These considerations
weigh against disclosure for topics of information that pose
greater political risks. In contrast, for information related to
private goals, disclosure might follow a logic of targeting beneﬁts, as does distributive spending, strategically disclosing information that helps the requester get a job, win a contract, or
receive government beneﬁts, in order to reward supporters and
punish opposition.
Ofﬁcials responding to information requests consider both
their own interests (including individual career goals and organizational reputation) and the interests of their political
principals. The prevalence of political appointees and patronage in bureaucratic agencies produces dependence on the
governing political party’s interests. We thus expect that ofﬁcials responding to information requests operate, at least in
part, as agents of the party controlling the presidency, and act
in accordance with their political interest.
Both public and private goals can be furthered by favoring copartisans. Ofﬁcials can discriminate directly in cases of
known requesters, or use the political alignment of the location from which a request originates to infer the likelihood
that the requester is an “ally” or “adversary.” Either case means
that ofﬁcials respond in ways that disproportionately favor government supporters and government-supporting areas. Thus,
our Partisan Discretion hypothesis predicts that, across all
types of requests, those from government-supporting areas receive more favorable responses than those from oppositionsupporting areas.
We further pose two subsidiary and competing hypotheses,
regarding whether such partisan discretion follows a logic of
targeting beneﬁts or one of mitigating political risk. A naive
deployment of ﬁndings from the distributive politics literature would predict a strategy based on targeting beneﬁts. As
such, if ofﬁcials manipulate disclosure decisions as part of a
clientelistic strategy to target voters with particularistic beneﬁts (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2016; Gans-Morse et al. 2014; Stokes
et al. 2013), we would expect to see stronger effects for topics
of information requests that contribute to private, rather than

public goals. The Targeting Beneﬁts hypothesis predicts that
partisan effects are stronger for requests on topics of information about private needs or beneﬁts than about information with public potential.
In light of the above discussion about the acute political
risk posed by disclosure of information with public relevance,
however, we have reason to expect the opposite. Given the
high costs associated with scandal weighed against the marginal payoff for helping allies access beneﬁts—as well as incentives to appear impartial and maintain high response rates—
we hypothesize that ofﬁcials may exercise more discretion in
disclosing information that poses political risks than in disclosing that which generates private beneﬁts. Therefore, the Mitigating Risk hypothesis predicts that partisan effects are stronger
for requests on topics of information with public potential than
about private needs or beneﬁts.

ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN MEXICO
Mexico’s Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública Gubernamental (LFTAIPG) was passed in June
2002, taking effect one year later. An ATI law was a campaign promise of President Vicente Fox’s Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) in the watershed 2000 presidential election. Although Fox initially proposed weak draft legislation, sustained
civil society, media, and opposition pressure contributed to
the ultimate passage of a law with cross-party support, widely
hailed as one of the world’s strongest (Berliner and Erlich
2015; Michener 2011; Pinto 2009). The law’s implementation
and wide usage is seen as a model among developing countries (Bookman and Guerrero Amparán 2009; Michener 2011).
Notably, the ATI law created an independent information
commission, the Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información
(IFAI),2 tasked with promoting the new law, monitoring compliance, and resolving appeals. IFAI also created a centralized

2. In 2015, its name changed to INAI.
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online information portal through which government agencies
manage requests. Citizens ﬁle requests and receive responses
almost exclusively (97% of all requests) through this portal,
known as INFOMEX until 2016. When citizens do ﬁle handwritten requests (only 3% of all cases), agency ofﬁcials manage
these and enter the relevant information into the portal’s
database.
When a request is ﬁled, it is ﬁrst sent from the INFOMEX
system to the unidad de enlace, or transparency liaison unit,
within the government agency to which the request was directed. The unit’s staff reviews the request and directs it to the
relevant administrative units within the agency, unless simple
or common enough that it can be handled directly. Administrative units then return preliminary responses to the liaison
unit, with further communication if necessary before responses
are returned via INFOMEX. Most agencies manage these internal processes using combinations of e-mails and spreadsheets, with only 10% reporting automated management systems even as late as 2016 (Ríos Cázares, Castañeda, and García
2017). Each agency also has an internal information committee that reviews and approves some categories of denials or
deadline extensions. The head of the liaison unit sits on the information committee, along with a representative of the agency
head and an internal control ofﬁcer.3 This creates a formal
venue for discussions around how to respond, although informal discussions can also take place.
While several observers claim that INFOMEX maintains
requester anonymity (Guerrero Amparán and Toledo 2009;
Mizrahi and Mendiburu 2012; Sobel et al. 2006) this is not
generally the case. Indeed, Lagunes and Pocasangre (2019,
167) observe that “while Mexico’s FOIA system is supposed to
be identity blind, we rarely see instances in which the identity
of the individual is blacked out from requests.” And Fox and
Haight (2007, 40) note that “at ﬁrst, the IFAI tried to prevent
agencies from accessing personal data in SISI [INFOMEX’s
earlier name] accounts, however agencies insisted on knowing who was requesting information. The IFAI accepted this
position, in the absence of a legal basis for defending the anonymity of requestors.”
Individuals must create an account to use INFOMEX, and
provide not only their name and contact information but also
their physical address. This requester information can be seen
by liaison unit staff who ﬁrst receive requests and distribute
them within their agency. Some agencies use specialized software to keep requester information out of internal communications, but most do not. A 2016 survey of liaison units found

that 99% reported communicating about requests over e-mail
and 86% over telephone (Ríos Cázares et al. 2017, 61). Even
where specialized software exists, however, anonymity is not
guaranteed. In one large, cabinet-level ministry, liaison unit
staff claimed that their internal system did allow other ofﬁcials
to see full requester information.4
This complicated situation regarding requester information
leaves several avenues for discrimination, either by speciﬁc requester identity (which would only sometimes be informative,
and which we cannot observe in the publicly available data)
or by location (which is both systematically informative and
which we can observe). First, ofﬁcials in the liaison unit—who
can formally see requester information—might alter the speed
or nature of initial decisions based on the requester. Second,
the agency’s information committee might make different decisions regarding extensions or claims of classiﬁcation, conﬁdentiality, or nonexistence of the requested information. Third,
other ofﬁcials may see requester information despite mandates
to the contrary, due to the agency’s internal procedures or informal pressure. Several interviewees suggested that other ofﬁcials indeed attempt to ﬁnd out information about the requester (and potentially incorporate such information into their
decisions) and are sometimes successful.
There is a clear incentive for selective disclosure, as information requests often lead to public scandals or negative
media coverage. For instance, newspaper stories frequently
reference the use of information requests in reporting and investigation. These include information on potential misuse of
funds (Reforma 2005, 2015a) public employees lacking qualiﬁcations (Reforma 2014), irregularities in procurement or handling of supplies (Reforma 2008; El Universal 2013), and even
to investigate potential arbitrary detention by police forces and
the discovery of mass graves (Reforma 2012, 2015b).
In managing the political risks of disclosure, ofﬁcials face
conﬂicting incentives. Interviewed liaison unit ofﬁcials emphasized both their commitment to the law and to serving citizens,
and their fear of “getting in trouble” with IFAI, or of attracting
negative attention to the agency for poor compliance records—
all incentives in favor of disclosure. But ofﬁcials also discussed
political considerations. One ofﬁcial said that, for some sensitive requests (often relating to patronage spending), higherlevel ofﬁcials simply order the denial of the request, leaving
the liaison unit to come up with a defensible justiﬁcation. Another said that agency leadership sometimes argue directly with
the information committee in favor of denying speciﬁc requests. The head of yet another liaison unit directly invoked

3. Several procedural details were changed by a 2016 reform, but this
article refers to the situation during the period under study.

4. Interviews were conducted with ofﬁcials in the liaison units of seven
different government agencies in March 2017, under Arizona State University IRB number 00005773.
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the reputation of the head of the agency, saying “we have to
take care of the secretary. . . . We have to protect him.”
A 2007 survey (Díaz Iturbe 2007) of 1,221 high level staff at
150 federal entities further demonstrates these mixed incentives. The survey found 73% agreeing that “the federal government should give access to all the information that it
generates” (37) and 76% aware of sanctions for noncompliance, 29% of whom cited suspension as a likely penalty (26).
Yet at the same time, 53% reported that they were justiﬁed
in withholding requested information when they suspected the
information could be used to attack the agency (43), and respondents were broadly aware of a variety of strategies to
withhold information, such as declaring it nonexistent or the
responsibility of another agency, or requiring the requester to
collect a physical copy (44).
While government agencies and their ofﬁcials do not directly face electoral incentives, they cannot remain fully independent of them either. Top agency leadership are appointees
accountable directly to the President, and often seek to protect
their own reputations in pursuit of future political advancement. Liaison unit heads are frequently replaced, although in
some cases they remain in place through presidential transitions (even in 2012). Lower-level staff within each unit, particularly those with substantial experience or legal expertise,
are more likely to remain in place through a transition. Nearly
all relevant staff to this process are empleados de conﬁanza—
technically patronage appointees who may be ﬁred at will,
despite usually pursuing longer-term careers in the public
sector, and thus face incentives to protect their principals’
reputations. One interviewed ofﬁcial even noted liaison unit
directors had been ﬁred in the past for disclosing information
that displeased agency leadership.
A 2016 survey of liaison units (Ríos Cázares et al. 2017,
58–61) found that 88% of unit directors (and 76% of responsible staff ) were empleados de conﬁanza (with the bulk of the
remainder being even less secure temporary employees), averaging 91 (93) months in the agency, and 33 (57) months in
the response unit, respectively. Nearly all had at least undergraduate degrees, while roughly 40% of directors had either
master’s or doctorate degrees. The average response unit had
four to ﬁve staff, including the director. A survey of ofﬁcials at
the ATI system’s founding (Gill and Hughes 2005, 132) found
that “nearly one-half of respondents thought government ofﬁcials would only partially comply with the new access law and
said potential sanction by superiors, or the fear of such sanction, would prompt non-compliance.” Furthermore, given a
policy requiring that unit directors report directly to the agency
head, these ATI authorities are usually high-level agency ofﬁcials, invested in the well-being of the agency and its leadership (Ríos Cázares et al. 2017, 52).

SAMPLE, PREPROCESSING, AND TEXT ANALYSIS
We focus on Mexico’s publicly available administrative data
containing all ATI requests ﬁled with federal government
agencies during the period from June 2003 (when the law
came into effect) through August 2015, as made available
by the Mexican government via INFOMEX.5 These records
contain detailed information on each request, including the
date and time ﬁled, the agency to which the request is directed, the full request text, the date of response, the nature
of the response, and links to attached ﬁles associated with
the request or response. Another ﬁeld differentiates electronic requests (97% of the total) from manual requests ﬁled
on paper and entered electronically by ofﬁcials. While the
publicly available data protect the identities of requesters by
omitting names, user IDs, or answers to voluntary demographic questions, these data do include geographic information on a requester’s state and municipality, selected from
“drop-down” menus of predeﬁned options, thereby preventing misspellings.
While INFOMEX cannot prevent individuals from entering false information, misrepresentations of requesters’
locations appears to be relatively rare, as there is a strong
relationship between municipality size and request volume.
Across municipalities, the logged total number of requests
ﬁled and logged population are correlated at 0.76. If a large
share of requesters were selecting false locations, we would
not observe such a strong relationship. Further, any measurement error in this regard simply sets a higher bar for us to
identify meaningful results.
The text of each request corresponds to the requester’s
own open-ended description of the information they seek.
While the majority of requesters described the nature of their
requests within one of two primary text ﬁelds, roughly 13%
of cases included either some or all of the request as a ﬁle
attachment. We implemented an automated routine to download these based on links contained in the INFOMEX data,
convert them to machine-readable text, and incorporate them
into our corpus. We also removed all ofﬁcial requests for conﬁdential requester personal information.6 Finally, as a small
number of requests were extremely long, often where an
attached ﬁle contained an example report or a large spreadsheet, we truncated any request over 1,000 words, affecting
only 0.02% of requests.
We applied a set of preprocessing techniques to convert
our ﬁnal corpus of requests into a collection of individual

5. This excludes state-level authorities and constitutionally autonomous bodies, as these fall under different legal regimes.
6. While these use INFOMEX, they are governed by different legal
requirements, and additionally do not make public their request texts.
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“documents” compatible with the unsupervised topic models used below, as well as to ﬁx common typos, standardize
the use of accents, and remove any nongraphical characters.
We then processed each request text to remove all punctuation, numbers, names of months, and stopwords. The removal of these character sets is standard preprocessing for
our topic model techniques (e.g., Bagozzi 2015; Roberts et al.
2014) and helps to eliminate extremely common, but highly
uninformative, character strings. We also removed common
phrases used by requesters to indicate that the information
request is not provided in the text ﬁeld, but rather is attached. Next, we omitted sparse terms that do not occur in at
least 0.1% of the documents in our corpus, which is a common
means of eliminating extremely rare words that offer little insight into the shared topics across one’s text corpus (Grimmer
2012; Quinn et al. 2010). Finally, all remaining words were
converted to lower case, stemmed, and restructured into a
document-term-corpus before analysis. Altogether, these preprocessing steps created a corpus with 1,023,267 processed
request documents and 6,696 total unique words.
To uncover the different topics of interest to citizens making information requests, we use latent Dirichlet allocation
(LDA; Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003). LDA is an unsupervised
topic model that identiﬁes latent dimensions (topics) of texts.
LDA estimates such topics via a hierarchical Bayesian model
that treats documents as a ﬁnite mixture of underlying topics,
and topics as a mixture over a latent set of topic probabilities
(Blei et al. 2003, 993). In this manner, each identiﬁed topic can
be characterized by a set of words that LDA determines as
having the highest probability of association with that topic.
These topic-word associations can then be used to (i) interpret
each topic for its substantive meaning and/or (ii) to classify
one’s documents in terms of the topic(s) most likely to have
generated each document, based upon a document’s observed
distribution of words.
With LDA, the analyst must explicitly choose the number of topics, k, to be estimated. In appendix B (apps. A–C
are available online), we evaluate different approaches to this
choice, and identify a k p 20 as most appropriate for this
application based on both qualitative evaluation and quantitative model ﬁt statistics. We then estimate an LDA model
on our full corpus of 1,023,267 preprocessed request texts.
For this LDA model, in addition to setting k p 20, we assign the model’s a parameter to favor the assignment of a
single topic to each document,7 and use Gibbs sampling for
estimation. As such, this LDA model identiﬁes the 20 top-

7. We further justify this choice in app. B.

Number 1

January 2021 / 235

ics that best characterize the request texts across the entire
2003–15 period. We then classify each request according to
its single most “dominant” associated topic (although we also
utilize each request’s full set of twenty topic probabilities in
our analyses).
In appendix C, we discuss an extensive set of evaluations
aimed at interpreting these topics, including examination of
the words most representative of each topic, and a close reading of several hundred individual requests sampled from those
strongly associated with each topic. These interpretations are developed further in Berliner, Bagozzi, and Palmer-Rubin (2018).
Based on these evaluations, we split these twenty topics into
two sets: thirteen topics with higher public potential, and
seven topics oriented toward more private goals. These are
listed in table 2. We describe our LDA estimation strategy, and
dominant topic approach, in further detail in appendices B
and C.
Table 2. Twenty Topics of Requested Information

Topic Label

Percentage
of Requests

Environment and land

8.64

Individual needs

8.50

Budgets and spending

7.98

Commercial information

7.86

Distributive programs

7.06

Military, police, and crime

6.84

Government employees 1: salaries and beneﬁts

6.71

Government employees 2: functions and
qualiﬁcations

6.26

Energy and public utilities

5.65

Internal procedures and ofﬁcial documents

5.19

Medical statistics

4.67

Government employees 3: speciﬁc personnel

4.10

Public procurement 1: service providers

4.09

Banking, ﬁnance, and taxes

3.83

Education

3.66

Medical supplies 1: contracts and suppliers

2.82

Public procurement 2: procedures and documents

2.32

Public procurement 3: anticorruption

2.03

Medical supplies 2: purchases and spending

1.24

Medical supplies 3: inventories

.56

Note. Twenty topics in order from largest to smallest after assigning each
request to one primary topic, with the percentage of all requests. Topics
designated as having higher public potential are set in italics.
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By topics with higher public potential we mean those that
pose greater political risk to government entities. These include issues such as budgets and spending, crime and violence, environmental impacts, oil and utilities, distributive social
programs, public procurement, and a topic capturing requests
asking for information about speciﬁc public servants. These
have clear politically relevant uses for investigation, oversight,
media scrutiny, or political organizations. Requests on budgets
and spending or on distributive programs might be aimed at
identifying misuse of resources or favoritism. Requests about
local environmental impact, permits for construction projects,
or on decision procedures and compliance evaluations for government contracts might be aimed at uncovering corruption in
allocating contracts and permits, or noncompliance with legal
rules. Details on the scale of violence and the conduct of police
and military in the “Drug War,” or on the qualiﬁcations of public
ofﬁcials, both also have clear potential to generate negative
media attention or potential scandals. While even in these topics we still ﬁnd some requests that are not likely ﬁled with
public goals, it is nonetheless these categories of requests that
are most likely to activate a consideration of potential negative political consequences by ofﬁcials.
Topics with lower public potential primarily reﬂect individual citizen needs, commercial interests, and demand for
aggregate statistics. These pose less risk of generating negative
media or investigative attention. For example, one topic largely
comprises requests for information to fulﬁll individual citizen
needs, such as how to access speciﬁc government services or
how to complete speciﬁc procedures. Another primarily comprises requests for aggregate statistics pertaining to speciﬁc
medical conditions. Relatively legalistic and sophisticated requests for commercial information, likely ﬁled by companies
themselves for private purposes, dominate a third topic. And
while we identify other topics focusing on public employees as
having higher public potential (due to a focus on speciﬁc individuals or qualiﬁcations that might be used to identify unqualiﬁed patronage hiring), another topic is primarily made
up of requests seeking information on aggregate salary scales,
beneﬁts, and pensions—likely ﬁled by employees themselves.
In appendix C, we describe all twenty topics in more detail, provide example requests, and explain our categorization
of them as mainly “public” or mainly “private.” This division
of topics is not absolute: an individual request for budget information might be mundane and apolitical, while a request
pertaining to aggregate statistics might be aimed at evaluating
government performance. However, these divisions nonetheless enable the testing of our secondary hypotheses by capturing
the set of requests that are more likely to trigger political riskmanagement processes on the part of government ofﬁcials. As
a robustness check (app. A), we also analyze only the most

clearly private topic—Individual Needs—and the most clearly
sensitive topic—Military, Police, and Crime—individually.

MODELING GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS
Dependent variable
We are interested in government responsiveness to citizen
information requests. In the context of information requests,
responsiveness is the extent to which citizens receive the information they seek, in useful form, and in a timely fashion,
except in cases legitimately subject to legal exemptions from
disclosure. Given the complexities in deﬁning and measuring
these characteristics, we use information on both the timing
and types of responses to triangulate across different possible
measures of “nonresponsiveness.”
First, we measure the time to response in working days.
In calculating this variable, we exclude weekends as well as
ofﬁcial Mexican government holidays. However, given the presence of legal time limits for responses, we also employ two dichotomous measures of whether or not the response was late.
While the statutory deadline was 20 working days, ofﬁcials
could request extension of up to 40 working days. We use both
of these thresholds to construct separate indicators of late
responses. Across the whole data set, 66.4% of requests received
responses within 20 working days, while 89.3% of requests
received responses within 40 working days. Although a late
response may still provide the requested information, many
information requests concern time-sensitive matters, particularly when publicly relevant. Further, delays often reﬂect a
sensitive request that required greater intra-agency negotiation, either with the liaison unit or information committee.
We then employ three different measures of the type of
response, based on information provided by ofﬁcials’ categorization of the nature of their responses. Here we must confront two issues: First, that requests may be denied for legally
allowable reasons, and second, that state agents themselves categorize their response types, and may not always do so accurately. Fox, Haight, and Palmer-Rubin (2011), for example, ﬁnd
that some responses (from the 2003–5 period) were categorized
as positive with information delivered electronically, but the
actual electronic attachments contain written justiﬁcations
for not delivering the requested information. Nonetheless,
they still concluded that for responses classiﬁed as positive,
“information was actually provided in a satisfactory manner
approximately 87 percent of the time” (Fox et al. 2011, 9).
We thus focus ﬁrst on responses categorized as “Inexistencia de la información solicitada,” claiming that the requested
information does not exist, making up 5.9% of all responses.
According to Fox et al. (2011, 11), this is “the category of denial that leaves the greatest opening for agency opacity.” They
found that many agencies denied requests under this category
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without written justiﬁcation, concluding that “agencies have
discovered that this is the least risky way to deny requests for
information in cases where they did not want it released or
when assembling it would be a large burden,” especially since
“in contrast, the burden of proof is on the agency if it claims
that information requested is ‘conﬁdential’ or ‘reserved’” (Fox
et al. 2011, 14). Thus, while a denial for other reasons may well
be legitimate under the law, we consider the “Inexistencia”
responses to more clearly be examples of unresponsive state
agents.
Second, we construct another dependent variable for responses categorized as either “Negativa por ser reservada o
conﬁdencial” or “Información parcialmente reservada o conﬁdencial,” indicating that the information requested is either
fully or partially classiﬁed or conﬁdential. Although many of
these denials will be justiﬁed, there may be political bias on
the margins. These responses account for 3.6% of the total.
Finally, we construct a dependent variable to capture situations where ofﬁcials do disclose the requested information, but in a nonelectronic form that creates additional ﬁnancial or physical barriers to the requester. Whereas the
majority of positive responses are categorized as “Entrega
de información en medio electrónico,” meaning the information was delivered electronically, some are physically shipped
(requiring the requester to ﬁrst pay a fee), while others require the requester to physically appear at a government ofﬁce.
These place additional burdens on the requester (and further
compromise their anonymity) that in some cases may be
prohibitive—indeed several thousand requests appear abandoned in the INFOMEX system, without the requester having
ever paid the shipping fee. Lagunes and Pocasangre (2019,
169), discussing the burdensome procedure required to make
such payments, suggest that “fee charges appear to be a strategy by which to discourage citizens from pursuing a request.”
We capture these cases with three categories of responses:
“Notiﬁcación de envío” (shipping notiﬁcation), “Notiﬁcación
lugar y fecha de entrega” (place and date to pick up the information), and “Respuesta del solicitante a la notiﬁcación de
entrega de información con costo” (awaiting the requester
paying the fee). Together, these types of responses account for
4.9% of the total.
Each of these dependent variables captures different dimensions of responsiveness on which we might expect to
see political bias in accordance with our hypotheses. As an
initial visualization of these measures of responsiveness in
relation to political alignment, ﬁgures 1 and 2 plot each measure against state-level vote shares.8 Figure 1 plots average re-

Our primary independent variable captures political alignment at the municipality level. For each information request,
this variable takes the value of the governing party’s vote
share in the municipality of origin, in the previous presidential
election. Here, we ﬁrst match each request to the municipality
from which it was sent and to corresponding municipalitylevel data on presidential election vote shares. The resulting
variable, Government Vote Share, reﬂects PAN vote share from
the elections of Vicente Fox (2000–6) and Felipe Calderón
(2006–12), and PRI vote share from the election of Enrique
Peña Nieto (2012–18).
We control for the logged population of each municipality to avoid confounding by differences in requests from
large urban areas and smaller rural locales. We also control
for the logged “economic marginality” of each municipality,
an index of economic and demographic indicators, to ensure
that the effect of governing party political support is not
merely proxying for underlying economic differences.
We also include several request-level measures, in order
to capture features of requests that may inﬂuence the nature
of ofﬁcial responses. First, we control for all twenty sets of
topic probabilities, reﬂecting the extent to which each request
contains words associated with each of the twenty different
potential topics of request texts. We include indicators of
whether or not each request included an attached ﬁle, and
the medium of each request (electronic or physical), although
nearly all are electronic. We also measure the (logged) word
count of each request, and the (logged) ratio of characters to
words. This ratio of characters to words is included as a proxy
for “readability,” a measure of the complexity of text.
We also measure two other features of requests that might reﬂect their complexity or sophistication—legalism and punctuation.

8. We omit Morelos, as a Morelos-based group ﬁled thousands of highly
unusual requests (see app. C) whose more negative responses heavily inﬂu-

enced the state’s averages. While we do not omit Morelos from our subsequent analyses, our results are similar if we do.

sponsiveness to requests in each state, over the period up
until the 2012 presidential election, against the state-level PAN
vote share averaged between the 2000 and 2006 presidential
elections. Figure 2, in turn, plots average responsiveness over
the period after newly elected PRI President Enrique Peña
Nieto took ofﬁce in December 2012, against state-level PRI
vote share in the 2012 presidential election. In each case except one, the line-of-best-ﬁt slopes downward, suggesting
that areas of higher governing party support tended to receive
better responses. However, our subsequent approach moves
beyond the state level to use the individual request as the unit
of analysis.

Independent variables
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Figure 1. State-level averages for six different measures of responsiveness, plotted against state-level governing party vote shares. Response measures are
averages for all requests ﬁled in each state over the period up until the 2012 presidential election. Vote shares are PAN vote share averaged between the
2000 and 2006 presidential elections. Dashed line is a line of best ﬁt from a linear regression of response (state averages) on state vote share. Morelos
omitted as an outlier (see n. 8).

Some information requests are highly legalistic, citing provisions of the ATI law or otherwise conveying a level of expertise on the part of the requester that might inﬂuence the
ways that ofﬁcials respond. Other requests are clearly ﬁled by
individuals with little political sophistication, use very ordinary
language, and often omitting punctuation. To capture legalism,
we ﬁrst count the number of times each request includes a series of words or phrases that reﬂect references to the ATI law or
related legal provisions,9 and then measure this count as a ratio
of the length of each request. We also measure the incidence
of punctuation relative to the length of each request.10
To measure the investigative risk of individual requests in
a more ﬁne-grained manner beyond topics, we constructed a
“Corruption Discourse Index” using a dictionary of words drawn
from newspaper articles. We ﬁrst identiﬁed over 300,000 articles from two major newspapers (Reforma and El Universal)

9. These are: “ley federal de transparencia,” “ley de transparencia,”
“artículo,” “fracción,” “sujeto obligado,” and “LFTAIPG”—both with and
without accents where relevant and regardless of case.
10. The punctuation we consider is as follows: periods, commas, colons,
semicolons, question marks, and inverted question marks.

mentioning any of 20 large federal agencies with unambigious
names and abbreviations. We then developed a set of 18 search
terms pertaining to corruption or scandal, and identiﬁed the
set of articles containing such terms. We used these to produce
a dictionary of 4,568 words that were distinctive to the corruption articles, as compared to the noncorruption articles
about the same agencies. Each information request, in turn,
was scored with the proportion of words that matched this
dictionary. As expected, this measure on its own is strongly associated with worse responses.
We also control for a potentially relevant time-varying factor at the agency level, calculating a measure of “agency workload” to capture the (logged) number of requests received over
the preceding 30 days. For each agency, this variable takes a
different value on each day of the period under study, reﬂecting
the fact that ofﬁcials facing a larger “queue” of pending requests
may respond in different ways. We also include indicators for
each month of the year, to capture any seasonal trends in response patterns.
Finally, we include a set of ﬁxed effects for each government agency (thereby making only within-agency comparisons for requests from different regions of the country), each
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Figure 2. State-level averages for six different measures of responsiveness, plotted against state-level governing party vote shares. Response measures are
averages for all requests ﬁled in each state over the period after newly elected PRI president Enrique Peña Nieto took ofﬁce in December 2012. Vote shares
are PRI vote share in the 2012 presidential election. Dashed line is a line of best ﬁt from a linear regression of response (state averages) on state vote share.
Morelos omitted as an outlier (see n. 8).

year (to capture across-the-board time trends), and each “dominant” topic category (reﬂecting the topic with the highest
probability of association with each request). Rather than including these ﬁxed effects separately (which we show in app. A),
we employ a separate ﬁxed effect for every single agency-topicyear combination. That is, our models make comparisons only
among requests ﬁled with the same agency, on the same topic,
and in the same year—but from different parts of the country
with varying political alignment. For example, comparisons
are made among requests ﬁled with the environmental ministry, on the topic of budgets and spending, in the year 2008—
but not across different topics of information in requests ﬁled
with that same ministry, and not across requests for budget
and spending information in requests ﬁled with different ministries, and not across different time periods. This distinction
is important, as we do not wish to assume that each government agency has the same baseline procedures for responding
to different topics of requests, or to assume that changes in
internal procedures over time took place according to identical
time lines across agencies. These very ﬁne-grained ﬁxed effects
automatically capture the effect of any omitted variable that
varies across agency-topic-year combinations, and allow us to

more closely approximate the level of comparability that would
be obtained in an experimental approach.

Sample and modeling approaches
Rather than using the entire sample of over 1 million requests,
we carefully select the set of requests for which our hypotheses
are most appropriate. First, we omit the roughly half of all
requests originating from the Federal District, where Mexico
City is located. Given the preponderance of media, political,
legal, and civil society organizations ﬁling requests in the capital, we would be concerned that these requests are less comparable with those in the rest of the country, would make the
municipality of origin a less reliable proxy for the likely political alignment of the requester, and would potentially lead
to misleading results given the high support for the PRD in
the capital city. However, results remain highly similar when
we instead retain Federal District observations (app. A). Second, we omit agencies that only rarely receive requests, as their
responses are likely to be more idiosyncratic. We include only
agencies that received, on average, more than one request per
week. While this retains only 189 of 304 possible agencies, it
removes only 36,074 requests, a small fraction of the total.
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Results remain highly similar when we retain these (app. A).
Third, to avoid any bias from “right-censoring,” we remove
any requests ﬁled after May 1, 2015, or otherwise unresponded
to by our August 2015 cutoff. Finally, we omit all requests ﬁled
in the period between July 1, 2012—the date of the 2012 presidential election—and the end of 2012 when the new PRI President Enrique Peña Nieto took ofﬁce.11 For purposes of evaluating the effects of political alignment, this period is likely
to be idiosyncratic, and it is not clear which party’s supporters we would expect potential political bias to favor. The resulting sample includes 456,747 individual requests.
We employ two main modeling approaches. The ﬁrst is
to model responses as a function of the previously mentioned
covariates, making cross-municipality comparisons between
requests sent from areas of varying political alignment. By
including ﬁxed effects for each agency-topic-year combination, we account for potential unobserved confounders on
those dimensions. Our second approach instead leverages
changes in political alignment over time, adding ﬁxed effects
for municipalities and removing ﬁxed effects for each year.
This approach takes into account only the over-time variation
in political alignment between municipalities and the central
government, primarily arising from the change in the governing party after 2012. For both these approaches we employ
linear probability models, as employing categorical models
with such a large number of ﬁxed effects poses problems for
both computation and interpretation.12

RESULTS
Table 3 presents our main set of results, including the previously discussed control variables and ﬁxed effects for every
agency-topic-year combination. For ﬁve of the six dependent
variables, the coefﬁcient for government vote share is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at p ! :05. Only for classiﬁed/
conﬁdential responses is the coefﬁcient not signiﬁcant. Notably, the inclusion of ﬁxed effects means that this analysis
already accounts for any unobserved variation at the level
of agencies, topics, years, or any combinations thereof, as
well as controls for other municipality-level factors, requestlevel complexity, sensitivity, and sophistication, and the timevarying workload of each agency. These results offer strong
support in favor of the Partisan Discretion hypothesis. Ministry personnel do in fact appear to exercise discretion in
responding to information requests, favoring request from

11. Although the new president took ofﬁce December 1, 2012, we
exclude requests through December 31, 2012, to ensure that indicators for
2012 do not extend across two separate administrations.
12. In app. A, we show logit results for robustness. In all models, we
employ two-way clustered standard errors by both municipality and agency.

areas of core support. But which political logic drives this discretionary behavior—favoring allies with access to beneﬁts,
or keeping potentially damaging information out of the hands
of opponents?
To adjudicate between the Targeting Beneﬁts hypothesis and the Mitigating Risk hypothesis, we examine whether
political effects of government vote share appear differentially for topics of requests with higher and lower public potential. Table 4 presents results of models restricting the sample to only topics we categorized as having higher public
potential (this and all subsequent tables display only the main
coefﬁcients of interest, although all controls from table 3 are
still included). All negative coefﬁcients are greater in magnitude. Table 5 restricts the sample to only topics categorized
as having lower public potential. In this case, only one of the
coefﬁcients is statistically signiﬁcant.13 These results suggest
that greater political targeting of responses takes place for topics of information that pose potential political risks, and not
for politically mundane or purely private topics of information.
This ﬁnding is thus more consistent with the Mitigating Risk
hypothesis than the Targeting Beneﬁts hypothesis. In appendix A, we also show results employing an interaction term
between Government Vote Share and the indicator of higher
public potential. The coefﬁcient on the interaction term is negative in all cases, and statistically signiﬁcant for four of the
six models.
In appendix A, we present additional robustness checks
for our main ﬁndings from table 4. First, we include in the
sample the requests from the Federal District, which do not
substantially change our results. Second, we measure the main
independent variable in several alternate ways, including using
state-level rather than municipal-level vote shares (in case
ofﬁcials incorporate information about political alignment
at a more geographically aggregated level), or measuring the
governing party’s vote margin over the next-largest party
rather than vote share, or using vote shares from mayoral
elections in each municipality (though these are more limited
in data availability) rather than in presidential elections.
Results from these models remain largely in line with our
primary results. Third, we control for measures that capture
the extent to which a locale represents a “swing” district, as a
potential alternate hypothesis to ours might be that ofﬁcials
target better responses to such areas, in an attempt to provide
valuable services or better demonstrate government performance. We alternately use the Effective Number of Parties in
presidential vote shares of each municipality, or the closeness
13. A coefﬁcient equality test shows that the coefﬁcients for government vote share in tables 4 and 5 are signiﬁcantly different from each
other for models 1, 2, and 6.

Table 3. Full Models of Government Responsiveness to Information Requests

Dependent Variable
Government vote share
Log population
Log econ. marginality
Request length
Request readability
Request with attachment
Request medium
Request legalism
Request punctuation
Request corruption discourse
Log agency workload
Dependent variable mean
Observations
Adjusted R2

Model 1
LogDays

Model 2
Late20

Model 3
Late40

Model 4
Inexistencia

Model 5
Classiﬁed

Model 6
Nonelectronic

2.124**
(.038)
.007
(.006)
2.049**
(.015)
.189**
(.019)
.106**
(.032)
2.169**
(.018)
2.038
(.054)
1.060
(.656)
.365**
(.089)
.154*
(.069)
.057**
(.012)
2.561
456,747
.323

2.030*
(.013)
2.001
(.002)
2.016**
(.005)
.065**
(.007)
.045**
(.014)
2.043**
(.007)
2.071**
(.021)
.521
(.330)
.060
(.033)
.097**
(.026)
.030**
(.005)
.332
456,747
.240

2.022**
(.008)
2.005
(.003)
2.016**
(.004)
.032**
(.003)
.030**
(.007)
2.017**
(.006)
2.023**
(.008)
.219
(.184)
2.009
(.026)
.055**
(.010)
.014**
(.005)
.100
456,747
.161

2.017**
(.006)
2.002
(.002)
2.005*
(.002)
.010**
(.001)
2.006
(.005)
2.007
(.005)
2.013*
(.005)
.369
(.259)
2.008
(.016)
.014
(.013)
.008*
(.004)
.056
456,747
.123

.004
(.004)
2.000
(.001)
2.002
(.001)
.007**
(.002)
.015*
(.007)
2.011**
(.004)
.011
(.009)
.183
(.179)
.001
(.016)
.048**
(.012)
2.003
(.003)
.032
456,747
.092

2.012*
(.005)
.002*
(.001)
2.004
(.003)
.010**
(.002)
.033**
(.010)
2.003
(.005)
.070
(.038)
2.060
(.211)
.028
(.016)
.002
(.009)
2.008**
(.002)
.042
456,747
.121

Note. Models additionally include 20 topic probabilities, monthly indicators, and ﬁxed effects for every agency. Two-way clustered standard errors on
municipality and agency.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.

Table 4. Models of Government Responsiveness to Information Requests, with Sample Restricted to Topics
with Higher Public Potential

Dependent Variable
Government vote share
Dependent variable mean
Observations
Adjusted R2

Model 1
LogDays

Model 2
Late20

Model 3
Late40

Model 4
Inexistencia

Model 5
Classiﬁed

Model 6
Nonelectronic

2.162**
(.040)
2.593
305,115
.334

2.049**
(.014)
.346
305,115
.251

2.030**
(.009)
.109
305,115
.173

2.019**
(.007)
.062
305,115
.121

2.000
(.005)
.033
305,115
.096

2.021**
(.004)
.038
305,115
.098

Note. Models additionally include the same control variables as in table 3, 20 topic probabilities, monthly indicators, and ﬁxed effects for every agency-topicyear combination. Two-way clustered standard errors on municipality and agency.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.

242 / The Political Logic of Government Disclosure Daniel Berliner et al.

Table 5. Models of Government Responsiveness to Information Requests, with Sample Restricted to Topics
with Lower Public Potential

Dependent Variable
Government vote share
Dependent variable mean
Observations
Adjusted R2

Model 1
LogDays

Model 2
Late20

Model 3
Late40

Model 4
Inexistencia

Model 5
Classiﬁed

Model 6
Nonelectronic

2.052
(.053)
2.500
151,632
.300

.005
(.019)
.303
151,632
.213

2.009
(.012)
.083
151,632
.129

2.014*
(.006)
.045
151,632
.127

.012
(.007)
.030
151,632
.088

.006
(.011)
.050
151,632
.158

Note. Models additionally include the same control variables as in table 3, 20 topic probabilities, monthly indicators, and ﬁxed effects for every agency-topicyear combination. Two-way clustered standard errors on municipality and agency.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.

of the vote margin between the nationally governing party
and the largest other party. In either case, the coefﬁcient for
the “swing” variable is close to zero, and not statistically signiﬁcant, in all six models.
Fourth, we use alternative topic models, setting the number of topics to 19 or 21, instead of 20, to address potential
concerns over topic instability (Wilkerson and Casas 2017).
Fifth, we employ separate ﬁxed effects for each agency, topic,
and year (rather than for every combination thereof). Sixth,
we instead use more ﬁne-grained ﬁxed effects that make comparisons only among requests with identical agency, topic, year
and similar “level of difﬁculty.” Seventh, we take into account
potential relationships among the different outcome variables
by controlling for measures of response type in our models
of response time, and vice versa. Finally, we include additional request text-based control variables, assessing the prevalence of misspellings and irregular capitalization. In all of
these checks, the results remain substantially similar.

We next turn to a different approach, employing municipality ﬁxed effects to account for any unobserved municipallevel characteristics, while also identifying results based solely
on over-time changes within each municipality. That is, the
coefﬁcient on government vote share in these models is primarily informed by changes at the 2012 election, before which
its value reﬂects the PAN vote share and after which its value
reﬂects the PRI vote share in each municipality. If our ﬁrst
hypothesis is correct, then requests from a largely pro-PAN
municipality should receive more favorable responses before
2012, and less favorable responses afterward, and vice versa
for a largely pro-PRI municipality. Table 6 presents the results of models including municipality ﬁxed effects, in addition to the other control variables in the models from table 3,
as well as ﬁxed effects for every agency-topic combination. We
do not incorporate ﬁxed effects for year, in order to capture
within-municipality variation over time in political alignment.
In four of the six models, the coefﬁcient on government vote

Table 6. Models of Government Responsiveness to Information Requests, including Municipality Fixed Effects

Government vote share
Dependent variable
Dependent variable mean
Observations
Adjusted R2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

2.291**
(.058)
LogDays
2.561
456,747
.263

2.143**
(.030)
Late20
.332
456,747
.194

2.065**
(.020)
Late40
.100
456,747
.130

2.035**
(.011)
Inexist.
.056
456,747
.086

.001
(.007)
Classif.
.032
456,747
.067

2.014
(.010)
NonElec.
.042
456,747
.099

Note. Models additionally include the same control variables as in table 3, 20 topic probabilities, monthly indicators, and ﬁxed effects for every agency-topic
combination. Two-way clustered standard errors on municipality and agency.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
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share is statistically signiﬁcant, in all four cases at a p ! :01
level. We further test our subsidiary hypotheses in the
municipality-ﬁxed effects approach (app. A), and ﬁnd that
the effects of political alignment are stronger among topics of
information with higher public potential, than among those
with lower public potential.
To assess the substantive sizes of these effects, we compare
the responses to hypothetical requests from municipalities
with governing party vote shares of 0.25 and 0.75, based on the
main results in table 3. A request from the more governmentopposed municipality would be 4.9% more likely to receive
a response later than in 20 working days, 13.5% more likely to
receive a response later than in 40 working days, 19.8% more
likely to receive a response claiming that the information does
not exist, and 12.8% more likely to receive a nonelectronic
response.14 Further, these effects are larger for the sample of
topics with higher public potential.
We emphasize that these represent average effects, across
a wide variety of agencies, time periods, and topics of information. Many requests will be routine, and pose no chance
of activating a consideration of political risk on the part of
ofﬁcials. Only for some subset of requests would we expect
any chance of ofﬁcials considering the identity of the requester
or the political alignment of their location in the ﬁrst place.
We are thus capturing differences averaged across a set of
requests that falls within the scope conditions of our argument, and a set of requests that falls outside those scope conditions. While we differentiate between two sets of requests
based on the likely public potential of their topics, this can
only capture a partial level of detail.
Mindful not to engage in “cherry-picking” subsets of our
data without a priori theoretical reasons, we do offer one illustrative example of a subset of information requests with results indicating much stronger effects of local political alignment. In appendix A, we present results for a sample of only
requests ﬁled with Petróleos Mexicanos, or PEMEX, the state
oil company (and again omitting requests ﬁled from the
Federal District). All coefﬁcients are much larger in magnitude than in the main results from table 2. Comparing hypothetical requests from municipalities with varying vote shares
as above, our results suggest that a request from the more
government-opposed municipality would be 19% more likely
to receive a response later than in 20 working days, 31.1% more
likely to receive a response later than in 40 working days, 44.6%
more likely to receive a response claiming that the infor14. Percentage increases on the baseline probability of each outcome.
We skip classiﬁed responses as we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effects in line with
our expectations for this outcome type.
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mation does not exist, and 78.6% more likely to receive a
nonelectronic response. This illustration suggests that the extent of political discrimination is much stronger than our primary results suggest for some agencies, types of information,
or speciﬁc time periods. On the other hand, many other types
of requests are routine and likely to be handled in a purely
impartial manner, and some entire agencies may be fully professionalized and impartial such that they allow no discrimination whatsoever.

CONCLUSION
We study responsiveness in the provision of government
information, using publicly available data containing every
information request ﬁled with Mexican federal government
agencies from 2003 to 2015. Similar to studies of distributive
politics, we analyze how responsiveness is shaped by discretionary partisan bias. Yet while something of a consensus in
the distributive politics literature has emerged that politicians
target core supporters with private beneﬁts—useful in clientelistic exchange—more than with public goods, we ﬁnd the
opposite. Ofﬁcials favor areas of core support with information that lends itself to generating public accountability and
demonstrate little to no partisan bias in the provision of
information useful in generating private beneﬁts for the
requester.
Underlying these ﬁndings are multiple countervailing incentives confronting the agents of accountability who are charged
with responding to information requests. Although ostensibly
institutions of downward accountability, as well as horizontally accountable to the oversight body IFAI, ofﬁcials are also
accountable upward to their agency heads and politicians with
electoral incentives. These multiple forms of accountability
create different motivations for and against disclosure in
different circumstances. Favoring disclosure, they may be motivated by an interest in sustaining a positive image of their
ministries, career incentives based on performance, sanctions
for noncompliance, or personal commitment to transparency.
The main incentives disfavoring disclosure are the political
risk associated with releasing evidence of corruption or poor
governance to the general public, along with the needs to
comply with ofﬁcial exemptions, and cope with limited capacity. While agencies certainly could exercise partisan discretion
in delivering information useful for reaping private beneﬁts,
they instead exercise caution in the provision of information
that has public potential, given the high political cost associated with scandals.
By incorporating information on the topics, complexity,
sensitivity, and sophistication of requests, and making comparisons only among requests ﬁled with the same government
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agency, on the same topic, and in the same year, we address
concerns over underlying differences in the requests themselves. We ﬁnd evidence that municipalities with higher vote
shares for the president’s party receive more favorable responses, across multiple measures of responsiveness. However, this ﬁnding holds only for requests on topics of information with higher public potential, and not for more private
topics of information.
Our ﬁndings demonstrate that, even in a relatively routine
mode of citizen-government interaction featuring decentralized decisions made by large numbers of ofﬁcials, ruling-party
interests and the need to manage political risks can generate
dynamics of responsiveness favoring areas of core government
support. These ﬁndings also suggest that, despite formal rules
intended to preserve requester anonymity and procedural fairness in Mexico, informal political dynamics shape bureaucratic
processes and allow political discrimination to take place. Yet,
on the other hand, we ﬁnd no evidence of a clientelistic logic
in the discretionary disclosure of information to confer private beneﬁts. This suggests some success in insulating accountability mechanisms from patronage politics, yet their replacement with partisan bias of a different form.
Our results, we believe, are applicable well beyond the case
of Mexico. We would expect to ﬁnd similar bias in responsiveness to citizen information requests in any system featuring the means (functioning ATI institutions), motive (electoral or institutional sanctions for politicians), and opportunity
(bureaucratic discretion and compromised anonymity) for such
discrimination. This includes a wide variety of democratic and
nondemocratic regimes. To be sure, geographic targeting on
the basis of electoral returns is not the only strategy available
to ofﬁcials to discriminate in disclosure; they may also base
decisions on other cues that signal the provenance of the request, such as the sophistication of the language, signals of insider knowledge, or even the precise identity of the requester—
as in Roberts’s (2005) study of Canada. However, given the
politically damaging nature of corruption revelations in even
the most mature democracies, we expect the ﬁltering of potentially damaging information to be a primary consideration
in discretionary disclosure.
Reforms aimed at minimizing such abuses could include
measures to insulate bureaucrats charged with handling information requests from partisan motives, strengthen oversight agencies to detect and sanction noncompliance, and better
procedural protections for citizen anonymity. However, such
policies are typically much easier to propose than to meaningfully establish.
More broadly, the problem of discretionary responsiveness in institutions of accountability is a particularly daunting
challenge for all democracies, transitional democracies in par-

ticular. Institutions created or strengthened through “secondgeneration” democratization—such as anticorruption agencies, state auditors, and judiciaries—have proven quite resistant
to attempts to augment their autonomy and aggressiveness
(O’Donnell 1998). Our ﬁndings extend this concern to transparency institutions, demonstrating how an institution designed to empower citizens to hold politicians accountable can
be utilized by state actors as a tool of selective responsiveness.
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